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VIRTUAL TRANSFER PRICE NEGOTIATIONS:
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ABSTRACT
Despite decades of research concerning the impact of
computer-mediated communication (CMC) on decision-making,
the potential interaction with the organization's management
control system has just recently received attention. Media
naturalness theory is used to develop hypotheses concerning the
interactions of communication medium with the incentive pay
scheme, a ubiquitous aspect of management control .systems.
A laboratory experiment was used to examine the interactions
between two treatments: face-to-face negotiations versus virtual
(computer-mediated) negotiations and ctxiperative versus
competitive incentive pay schemes. Buyer-seller dyads negotiated
the price and quantity of the transferred goods. Results indicate
that while virtual negotiations are more efficient in terms of time
than face-to-face negotiations, there is not a significant interaction
with the incentive pay scheme for efficiency. However, results
also indicate that virtual negotiations are less effective in terms
of optimal quantity (organizational profit) than face-to-face,
and that there is a significant interaction with the incentive pay
scheme. Virtual negotiations have the unintended consequence
of reducing the effectiveness (organizational profitability) of the
negotiations.
Keywords: Computer-mediated communication,
negotiations, transfer pricing, media naturalness theory.

SAKTHI MAHENTHIRAN
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Indianapolis, IN

communication mediums examined are face-to-face and
computer mediated (virtual) and the incentive schemes are
cooperative and competitive. The impacts on time to complete the
negotiations (efficiency) and profit maximization (effectiveness )
were examined. The results indicate that communication medium
does not interact with incentive scheme for time, but does for firm
profit. Virtual negotiations are more efficient in terms of the main
effect of time than face-to-face negotiations, however, there is not
a significant interaction with the incentive pay scheme on time.
Results also indicate that virtual negotiations are less effective
in terms of quantity transferred (profit) than face-to-face, and
that there is a significant interaction with the incentive pay
scheme. Virtual negotiations have the unintended consequence of
reducing the profitability (effectiveness) of the negotiations. It is
critical that organizations become aware of this interaction before
they encourage the use of computer-mediated communication for
negotiations.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next
section reviews the literature. The third section describes the
dependent variables and presents the hypotheses. The fourth
section describes the experiment. The fifth section gives the
statistical results. The final section presents conclusions.

virtual

LITERATURE REVIEW
Communication •mediated Communication

INTRODUCTION
Because organizations rely heavily on virtual communication,
it is important to understand the interactions between virtual
communication and the management control system and the
effect of interactions on organizational performance. Early
computer-mediated communication (CMC) research focused
on design and contextual factors that could potentially impact
the success of virtual communication [10. 11]. Design factors
included medium, anonymity, and process structure. Contextual
factors included task, group size, and member proximity. With
few exceptions, the organizational environment was not included
in the early research.
More recently, incentives, an omni-present element of the
organizational environment, have been examined in CMC research
(2, 21]. However, both theoretical and empirical researchers have
focused on cooperative tasks. It is widely accepted that the type
of task influences the success of CMC [10]. Here we focus on a
negotiation task. Negotiation tasks are different from consensus
tasks in that they have an innate motivation for self-interest and
can have both competitive and cooperative aspects. Negotiations
are also pervasive in organizations [20. 25].
The purpose of this study is to examine the interaction
of communication medium and incentive scheme in an
intra-organizational transfer price negotiation scenario. The
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The CMC literature draws on theories that are primarily
concerned with social aspects of communication (e.g.. social
presence, social influence), on theories that are primarily
concerned with technological aspects of communication (e.g.,
media richness, task-technology fit), and on theories that integrate
both aspects (e.g.. media naturalness). A common aspect in most
of these theories is that they are concerned with the interaction
between the communication medium and the task.
Social presence theory, which pre-dates CMC capability, has
had a significant influence on CMC research [15]. Under social
presence theory, communication is more effective when the
medium used has the appropriate level of social presence for the
level of interpersonal involvement necessary for the task. Social
influence theory emphasizes the importance of social influence
on attitudes toward the use of different communication media.
However, under social influence theory, influences like peer
pressure, cultural background, and mental schema may have a
stronger effect on attitudes towards a medium and the actual use
of a medium than characteristics of the medium itself.
Media richness theory [4,9.15] extends social presence theory
and classifies communication media according to its ability to
convey natural language, nonverbal cues, personality traits, and
immediate feedback. Under media richness theory, the criterion
for choosing the appropriate media for the task is based on the
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need to reduce uncertainty in the communication. Face-to-face
communication is the richest medium. The telephone is less rich
because visual cues are not available. Most intranet- and internetbased media are near the other end of the spectrum, which is
often denoted as media leanness, as opposed to richness. Tasktechnology fit theory [27] proposes a set of profiles composed of an
internally consistent set of task contingencies and communication
elements that affecl performance. Like social presence theory,
media richness and task-technology fit theories emphasize using
the appropriate medium for the designated task 117].
The media naturalness theory, also known as the
psychobiological theory [15, 16] proposes that there is a negative
causal association between the "naturalness" of a computermediated communication medium, which is based on the
similarities to face-to-face communication, and the cognitive
effort required for the person using the medium. The less similar
the medium is to face-to-face, the more cognitive effort that is
required. This theory is integrative in that it encompasses previous
theories, instead of attempting to negate them, and because it
examines the rea.sons why face-to-face and CMC can lead to
different outcomes. The task is an aspect of this theory, but the
focus is on the cognitive effort required by the difference between
'natural" medium (face to face) and lean CMC mediums.
Empirical CMC research, as classified by Fjermestad (2004),
has typically modeled communication mode (face to face versus
CMC) as the primary independent variable. Other independent
variables include context, group, method, process structure,
task, and task support. Moderating (adaptation) and intervening
variables include communication dimensions (media richness,
social presence), group member perceptions of task, adaptation
process (rules, resources), process gains and losses, group role.
Dependent variable categories include consensus, effectiveness,
efficiency, satisfaction and usability.
Thus, the CMC literature has been concerned with the
interaction of the task and the medium on the performance of the
task itself. A wide variety of tasks (e.g., idea generation, problem
solving and consensus) and myriad aspects of the medium (e.g.,
synchronous, asynchronous, structured interactions, support
available) have been examined. While empirical results have
been somewhat mixed on the relative benefits of CMC versus
face-to-face [1. 9. 12], it is widely accepted that communication
medium and task characteristics do interact to impact outcome
measures of the task.
Further, thi.s body of research, with the above noted exceptions,
has examined the impacts of CMC on decision making without
considering the organizational factors that could influence or
interact with the implementation of CMC. The organizational
factor considered here is whether the communication takes place
in a cooperative or a competitive situation.
Competitive versus Cooperative Incentives
Deutsch (1980) proposed a theory that identified potential
outcomes of cooperation and competition and Ihe processes that
underlie those outcomes. Cooperation and competition can refer to
the interdependence between goals [22]. In cooperative situations,
the achievement of one person's goal is positively related to the
achievement of another person's goal (one person's movement
toward their goal facilitates the other person's movement towards
their goal), in competitive situations, the achievement of one
person's goal is negatively related to the achievement of another
person's goal (one person's movement toward their goal interferes
Winter 2008-2009

with the other person's movement towards their goal). Rewards or
outcomes in both cooperative and competitive situations may be
either be (i) pre-determined (called zero-sum game) or (ü) relative
to the combined actions of the parties. Perceived interdependence
of goals can affect group productivity and problem solving ability
[24|. One way to create cooperative or competitive situations is
through the incentive scheme [3].
Although the impact of cooperative and competitive incentives
have been extensively examined for individual decisions [22], the
research on the effects of incentives on mulli-person decision
making processes is limited. A primary focus of this research
is the effect of incentives on information sharing. Ferrin and
Dirks (2003) found that cooperative incentive schemes led to
higher trust and information sharing. Incentives have also been
found to interact with communication medium. In a production
planning task, Barkhi, Jacob, and Pirkul (2004) found that
cooperative incentives led to higher performance in face-to-face
communication than in virtual communication and that individual
incentives led to more similar performance in both mediums.
They also found that a significant interaction between medium
and incentive scheme on truthful information sharing.
Thus, cooperative versus competitive goals affect behavior.
Incentives can be used to foster these goals. Incentives have been
shown to interact with some aspects of information systems. But,
to our knowledge, the impact of cooperative versus competitive
situations on negotiation behavior when utilizing virtual
negotiations has not been previously examined.
Transfer Pricing Negotiations
Negotiation situations are of special interest here because
they can vary in the same manner as incentive schemes, from
cooperative (win-win, also called integrative) to competitive
(win-lose). Transfer pricing negotiations for the price and quantity
of an intermediate good are a particularly interesting form of
negotiation because they contain aspects from both ends of this
spectrum. The larger the quantity of goods transferred, the larger
the profit to be divided between divisions (cooperative). But the
transfer price determines the portion of the profit that goes to
each division (competitive). Negotiators have a stake in both the
quantity and the price. Therefore, negotiated transfer pricing is
usually considered to be a mixed-motive situation [23j.
Negotiated transfer pricing is also an important form of
negotiation because the outcomes are of interest not only to the
negotiators (divisions), as described above, bul also to organization
as a whole. The quantity transferred determines the organization's
total profit from the transfer. The price determines the divisions"
profits, which can be used for performance evaluation. Thus, the
organization also has a stake in both the quantity and the price.
Incentives have been recognized as a factor in the success of a
transfer pricing system [13].
Thus, this study differs from most previous CMC studies
because it examines the differential impacts of moving to
CMC under different organizational situations (different
incentive schemes) in a negotiation task. This examination is
important because, despite the widely recognized importance
of organizational factors in systcm.s design, there is a paucity of
empirical evidence on the interaction of communication medium
with organizational factors. Transfer pricing negotiations are used
as the experiment task because they provide an opportunity to
examine a structured task with both competitive and cooperative
aspects. Further, the process and the outcomes of the negotiations
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are of interest both to the negotiator and to the firm deploying the
CMC system.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
Effectiveness
Effectiveness was measured by the quantity transferred.
This is an appropriate measure because the quantity of the good
transferred determines the firm profit from the transfer. From
the firm's perspective, an effective outcome of the negotiation
process is the transfer of the optimal quantity (the quantity
which maximizes total firm profit). This assumes that revenue
from the final sale of the good to the external customer and
the cost function for the production of the good are exogenous
(given) to the transfer pricing negotiations. From the divisional
perspective, since the optimal quantity maximizes the firm profit,
it also maximizes the potential profit to be divided between the
divisions.
Empirical results have shown that, in the absence of incentives,
face-to-face communication is more effective than CMC [I]. In
a meta-analysis of a broad range of CMC studies. Baltes et al.
(2002) found that for negotiation and mixed-motive tasks. CMC
led to decreased effectiveness from face-to-face. These results
are consistent with media-natural ness theory. Media naturalness
theory [15, 16] predicts that a decrease in media naturalness
(moving from face-to-face negotiations to virtual negotiations)
leads to increased cognitive effort and increased communication
ambiguity.
Empirical results have also shown that cooperative incentives
lead to higher effectiveness than competitive incentives [5. 8].
In mixed motive situations like transfer pricing, cooperative
incentives can lead negotiators to focus on jointly increasing
the total profit to be divided. Competitive incentives can lead
negotiators to focus on maximizing their share of the total profit.
Competitive situations can also lead to have increased cognitive
effort to process the implications of both their own actions and
the other person's actions and reactions.
While communication medium and incentives have each been
shown to impact firm profit (effectiveness), the issue for this study
is how communication medium and incentives interact to impact
firm profit in a transfer pricing situation. The Íncrea.sed cognitive
effort required for the combined competitive situation and virtual
communication leads us to predict a significant interaction. The
specific form of the interaction is the differential impact of CMC
in different incentive (organizational) situations, leading to the
following:
HI: The impact on effectiveness (quantity transferred)
of moving from face-to-face to computer-mediated
communication will be significantly greater in the
cooperative situation than in the competitive situation.
Efficiency
One measure of the efficiency of a process is the amount of
time spent on the process [46]. Efficiency was measured by the
number of minutes taken to reach agreement or impasse.
Media naturalness theory [15, 16] predicts that a decrease
in media naturalness (moving from face-to-face negotiations
to virtual negotiations) leads to increased cognitive effort and
increased communication ambiguity. Virtual negotiations would

take longer than face-to-face because negotiators would need more
time to think through offers and to assess the other negotiator's
stance. There is also increased communication ambiguity because
less information is available under CMC. This would imply
decreased efficiency under CMC.
In cooperative situations, negotiators would be motivated
to work toward a common goal, to maximize firm profit. In
competitive situations negotiators would be motivated to work
toward increasing their own share of the profit. Individuals have to
have increased cognitive effort to process the implications of both
their own actions and the other person's actions and reactions.
This would also imply decreased efficiency under CMC.
The issue for this study is how communication medium and
incentives interact to impact efficiency. The increased cognitive
effort required for the combined competitive situation and virtual
communication again leads us to predict a significant interaction.
The specific form of the interaction is the differential impact of
CMC in different incentive (organizational) situations, leading to
the following:
H2: The difference in efficiency (number of minutes)
between face-to-face and computer communication will be
significantly greater in the cooperative situation than in the
competitive situation.
THE EXPERIMENT
Negotiation Task
The experimental scenario had the manager of a buying unit
and the manager of a selling unit involved in intrafirm bilateral
negotiations for the transfer price and quantity of an intermediate
good. Bilateral negotiations are common in vertically integrated
firms where one division produces an input used by the second
division. Therefore, the use of negotiating dyads is appropriate
for an investigation of intrafirm communication and incentives.
While multi-party negotiations are interesting, dyads provide
greater simplicity for analyzing the effects of communication
and incentives by eliminating issues such as coalition formation
which are not the primary topic of this paper.
The buying unit manager had the marginal revenue schedule
forthere.sale prices of the goods, but did not know the production
costs. The selling unit manager had only the marginal cost
schedule for the production costs of the goods. Thus, information
asymmetry existed between the managers. The marginal revenue
and cost schedules were adopted from DeJong, Forsythe. Kim &
Uecker (1989). as shown in Figure 1. A major benefit of using
marginal revenue and marginal costs is that an economic optimal
(profit-maximizing) quantity can be determined, allowing results
to be objective, as opposed to subjective measures of success. A
pilot was conducted to ensure that subjects could understand the
instructions and to determine that an adequate amount of time
was allowed for the negotiations.
The negotiation support system provided structured interactions
in face-to-face and computerized negotiations. Structured
interaction has been shown to improve the processes and
outcomes of negotiation [ 1 ]. Characteristics of CMC potentially
include parallel communication, group memory, anonymity, and
a structured pattern of discussion. Ours provides the last three.
Because we wanted to look at the actual negotiations rather than
the option generating portion of negotiation, we used sequential
communication. Other forms of decision support, such as the
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FIGURE L Marginai Revenue and Marginal Cost Curves
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explicit identification of objectives, were not included because
the issue of interest here is the communication medium, rather
than the effectiveness of various support system options.
Expérimentai Design
The experiment had a 2x2 design with communication medium
and organizational situation treatments. The two mediums were
face-to-face negotiations and computer-mediated negotiations.
Communication in the face-to-face medium followed a similar
structured format as in the computer mediated medium. The
structure of the negotiations is described below in the Experimental
Sequence section.
The organizational situation was operationalized through
cooperative and competitive incentive schemes serving as the
treatments. In both situations, the divisions earned a trading
income from the profits earned from the transfer pricing
negotiations and a fixed income. The fixed income served to keep
the subjects* cash remuneration from becoming negative in the
event of a trading loss. The trading profit was determined by the
quantity and the transfer price.
For buying divisions (retailers), the trading profit was the
difference between the resale value ofthe goods and the negotiated
amount paid to the seller. For selling divisions (manufacturers or
wholesalers), the trading profit was the difference between the
negotiated amount received from the buyer and the cost incurred
in producing or acquiring the goods.
In the cooperative situation, subjects earned 1% their own
division's fixed income plus i^% of the organization's trading
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profit, which was determined by the quantity transferred. In the
cooperative situation, the buying and selling divisions equally
shared the profits from the transfer. This experimental treatment
is intended to induce cooperative behavior in both the buyer and
the seller.
In the competitive situation, subjects received 1% of their
own division's total profit, which included their fixed income and
their division's trading profit from the transfer. This experimental
treatment is intended to induce individualistic behavior that
maximizes divisional profit, but which may take the focus away
from.maximizing total company profit.
Experimental Sequence
Thirty-four undergraduate students enrolled in accounting
information systems and cost accounting classes served as
voluntary participants. Subjects were screened prior to the
experimental session based on theirresponses to autility preference
elicitation question. The question required the probability
assessment for a lottery that stated "If we were willing to give
you $5 for certain, or a gamble that pays $10 with probability p
or $0 with probability (1- p), what would p have to be so that you
are indifferent between receiving the $5 for certain and taking the
gamble?" Subjects were assigned a time slot with other subjects
who had approximately the same p value. This initial procedure
attempted to ensure that dyads consisted of trading partners with
similar risk preferences.
Subjects were randomly assigned to the buyer or the seller
position. Each subject participated in only one of the four sets
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FIGURE 2: Experimental Design
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of conditions {face-to-face and cooperative, face-to-face and
competitive, CMC and cooperative, CMC and competitive) for
the entire experiment. Because all subjects assigned to a cell did
not appear for the experiment, the number of dyads in each cell
varied. Please see Figure 2.
All subjects were given training to ensure that they understood
the negotiation and reward process. Subjects in both mediums
had to correctly complete the practice calculations before the
experiment began. If practice calculations were not correct,
oral explanations were given, and the subjects were required
to rework the calculations. No subject was allowed to proceed
with the experiment until they demonstrated an understanding
of the appropriate marginal cost/revenue curve, the negotiation
procedures, the business unit profit calculations, and the remuneration calculations. We used training rather than ex-post manipulation checks to ensure that subjects understood the experimental
procedures and the incentive treatments. We did this because the
experiment was costly in terms of money and time to both the
experimenters and the subjects. Due to space and equipment
limitations, the experiment could be administered to a maximum
of six subjects at one time. Because the experiments took place
outside the regular classroom time in the evenings, special trips
to campus required for many subjects and a limited number were
willing or able to do this. Gateway conditions based on training
assure that subjects understand the experiment procedures.
The negotiations took piace over ten trading periods. Each
period lasted for a maximum of twelve minutes. In the CMC
condition the twelve minutes were divided into six rounds in
which the buyer and the seller alternately had an opportunity
to accept offers or reject the trading partner's offer and submit
their own offers to the trading partner. Offers were made in the
form of price and quantity schedules. The schedules contained
the quantities available for transfer, i.e., 1 through 8 units.The
negotiators listed the average price they were willing to accept
for each quantity. The price and quantity offers were the only
infonnation communicated other than acceptance of an offer.
In the face-to-face condition the buyer and the seller exchanged
written offer schedules before beginning there negotiations. They
were then allowed to bargain verbally for the remainder of the
f>eriod. However, to ensure that the difference between mediums
was not due to differing levels of information, the subjects were
instructed to only exchange information about their marginal
revenues or marginal costs curves during their negotiations. The
experimenters monitored the negotiations to ensure that subjects
adhered to these instructions.
The first round of the first period began with the sel 1er entering
the prices for each quantity on offer schedule based on the marginal
production cost schedule. A two-minute limit was imposed for
preparing the schedules. Insufficient time to negotiate might lead
to uniformly high impasse rates. Tbe pilot had indicated that two
minutes was sufficient for each round and that six rounds was
sufficient for each period. Since our impasse rates were very
low, we concluded that two minutes was sufficient time for each
round.
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The experimenter/computer then transmitted the schedule to
the buyer. The buyer had two options: (i) accept a given price
and quantity combination, and an exchange would take place
and the trading period ended; or (ii) reject all price and quantity
combinations proposed by the seller and submit a schedule of
price and quantity counter-offers to the seller. The seller then had
two options: (i) accept a given price and quantity combination,
and an exchange would take place and the trading period ended;
or (ii) reject the buyer's combinations and prepare a new counter
offer schedule for the next round of negotiation. Trading periods
ended either when an offer was accepted or at the end of six
rounds of offers. If no agreement had been reached at the end of
six rounds, the negotiators were considered to be at an impasse
and no trade took place.
At the end of each period, buyers and sellers each calculated
their division's trading profit, if any. for the period. Under the
competitive incentive scheme, the subjects then added their fixed
income to the trading profit and used the total divisional profit
to calculate their actual cash earnings. Under the cooperative
incentive scheme, the buyer and seller each reported their trading
profit to the experimenter/computer, who equally divided the total
trading profit between the divisions. The subjects then added their
fixed income to their share of the trading profit and used that total
to calculate their actual cash earnings.
The subsequent periods proceeded in the same sequence except
that the initial submissions offer schedules alternated between the
buyer and the seller. Multiple sessions were needed because the
effect of incentives needs to incorporate time for feedback and
leaming (Sprinkle 2000). The subjects did not know the number
of periods in advance, so there should not have been end of
game strategies. At the end of the ten trading periods, subjects
calculated their total remuneration based on their performance.
(The calculations were later audited and subjects were sent a
check by mail.) The experimental sessions took approximately 2
hours.
RESULTS
The cell means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 1. The data was analyzed using a MANOVA because
there are multiple observations for each dyad. The statistical
results are presented in Table 2 — Section i. A MANOVA was
used because the effectiveness variable, transfer quantity, and
the efficiency variable, minutes, could be correlated, thereby
necessitating a joint analysis. A repeated measures MANOVA
was first performed on each of the dependent variables in the
study separately to see if there was a end-of-game effect. Since
no end-of-game effect existed, we then proceeded to use the
two dependent variable MANOVA to control for the potential
interdependence of the variables, and to increase the power of
the test. The lack of a time effect also indicates that there is
no significant leaming effect. The MANOVA analysis found
the interaction of medium and incentive was significant at the
.01 level.
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TABLE 1
Average Statistics by Independent Variables and Interaction (For Periods I-IO)

DYADS

TRANSFER
QUANTITY*
Optimal = 6 or 7

MINUTES*

MEDIUM:
FACE TO FACE (FTF)
COMPUTER

17
17

5.59 (1.79)
3.76 (2.41)

7.88(2.51)
6.14(3.08)

INCENTIVE:
COOPERATIVE
COMPETITIVE

18
16

4.96 (2.26)
4.45 (2.27)

7.01 (3.10)
8.24(2.91)

MEDIUM. INCENTIVE
FTE, COOPERATIVE
FTE, COMPETITIVE
COMPUTER, COOPERATIVE
COMPUTER. COMPETITIVE

8
9
10
7

6.08(1.61)
5.15(1.84)
3.84 (2.39)
3.64(2.46)

7.23 (2.70)
8.45(2.19)
5.84 (2.94)
6.57 (3.25)

* mean (standard deviation)

TABLE 2
Manova Results Face to Face vs Computer
i. TRANSFER QUANTITY
SOURCE
MEDIUM
INCENTIVE
MEDIUM*INCENTrVE
ERROR

¡^
1

1
1
336

ANOVA SS
284.47
9.77
27.64
1486.88

MEANSOUARE
284.47
9.77
27.64
4.43

E VALUE
64.28
2.21
6.25

PR>F
0.0001
0.1383
0.0129

ANOVA SS
257.69
115.98
0.00
2585.39

MEAN SQUARE
257.69
115.98
0.00
7.69

F VALUE
33.49
15.07
0.00

PR>E
0.0001
0.0001
1.0000

ii. MINUTES
SOURCE
MEDIUM
INCENTIVE
MEDIUM*INCENTrVE
ERROR

m
I
I
1
336

Effectiveness
Effectiveness was measured by the quantity transferred.
The optimal quantity of either 6 or 7 units had the highest firm
profit. The average quantity transferred is presented in Table
1. As expected CMC led to a lower level of effectiveness,
with an average of 3.76 units transferred, than did face-to-face
communication, with 5.59 units transferred. Also as expected,
a cooperative situation led to a higher level of effectiveness, an
average of 4.96 units transferred, than a competitive situation,
4.45 units transferred, although the main effect for incentive was
not significant. The directions of these results are consistent with
media naturalness theory.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the impact of moving from faceto-face to CMC will be greater when the negotiators are in a
cooperative situation than when negotiators are in a competitive
situation. The results of the MANOVA presented in Table 2 Section i indicate tbat the main effect for medium is significant,
the main effect for incentive is not significant, and the interaction
term is significant. This significant interaction implies that the
Winter 2008-2009

prediction in Hypothesis I was supported. In the cooperative
situation, CMC, with an average of 3.84 units transferred, was
less effective than face-to-face, with an average of 6.08 units
transferred (6 or 7 units transferred give the optimal profit). In
the competitive situation. CMC, with an average of 3.64 units
transferred, was again less effective than face-to-face, with
an average of 5.15 units transferred. This indicates that CMC
significantly decreased the effectiveness by an average 2.24
units in a cooperative situation and 1.51 units in a competitive
situation.
Efficiency
Efficiency was measured as the average time to agreement or
impasse. The maximum time was 12 minutes. As can be seen
from Table 1, CMC, with an average of 6.24 minutes, is more
efficient than face-to-face, with an average of 7.88 minutes.
This result is not consistent with the predictions of media
natural theory. A cooperative situation, with an average of 7.01
minutes, is more efficient than a competitive situation, with an
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average of 8.24 minutes. This is consistent with media naturalness
theory.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the difference in efficiency between
face-to-face and computer communication will be significantly
greater in the cooperative situation than in the competitive
situation. The results of the MANOVA presented in Table 2
—Section ii indicate that while both main effects are significant for
minutes, the interaction term is not significant, This implies that
the prediction in Hypothesis 2 was not supported. In a cooperative
situation, CMC, with an average of 5.84 minutes till agreement,
was more efficient than face-to-face, with an average of 7.23
rounds till agreement. In a competitive situation, CMC, with an
average of 6.57 minutes, is more efficient than face-to-face, with
an average of 8.45 minutes. However, while CMC improved the
efficiency by an average 1.39 in a cooperative situation and 1.88
minutes in a competitive situation, these improvements are not
statistically different from each other,

studentsorexperiencednegotiatorscould potentially have behaved
differently. Experience usually leads to enhanced skills and the
manipulations may not have been as effective with experienced
negotiators. Buyer/seller personal traits could be considered
(see [14] for an e-auction study of personal traits). Even though
participants were earning cash, lab studies do not have the same
pressures for perfonnance as actual negotiations. Finally, future
research could also examine interorganizational (supply chain)
transfer price negotiations. The management control issues are
more complex because it is often more difficult to negotiate faceto-face because of the global nature of many supply chains. And it
is more difficult to design interorganizational incentive schemes.
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CONCLUSIONS
One body of literature has examined the effect of moving
to CMC in decision-making tasks. Another body has examined
the effect of different incentives. The purpose of this paper is
to examine whether the impact of moving from face-to-face
communication to CMC differs depending upon the incentive
scheme.
Moving from face-to-face to virtual negotiations (CMC) led
to a decrease in effectiveness (transfer quantity and, therefore,
profitability) in both cooperative and competitive organizational
situations. In addition, the interaction was significant, the
decease was larger in the cooperative situation than in the
competitive situation. These results emphasize the importance
of considering the organizational environment when designing
and implementing CMC. It supports the contention of Baltes, et
al. (2(X)2) that face-to-face interactions may be more appropriate
than CMC in some organizational environments. It also supports
their contention that there may be unintended consequences of
advanced communication technology.
Moving from face-to-face communication to virtual
negotiations (CMC) led to an increase in efficiency in both
cooperative and competitive organizational situations. This is the
intended effect. The interaction was not significant, so designers
of management control systems cannot predict the impact on
negotiation time of virtual negotiations.
These results are similar to Barkhi. et al. (2004) in that the
incentive scheme interacted with communication medium. But
the results are different from Barkhi, et al. in that the highest
combined performance in their study was with computer-mediated
communication in the cooperative situation, and the highest firm
performance in our study was with face-to-face in the cooperative
situation. This difference is probably explained by the difference
in tasks: theirs was a consensus task and ours was a negotiation
task. Media naturalness theory [15. 16] recognizes that less
cognitive effort is required for the 'natural' medium (face to face
negotiations) than for virtual negotiations and the negotiation task
may require higher cognitive effort (see [26] for an example in a
virtual outsourcing scenario). But regardless of the difference, it
is clear that there may be unintended consequences with CMC.
Organizations need to be aware of these consequences and take
steps to mitigate them.
One limitation of this study is the use of undergraduate subjects.
While no expertise was required for the negotiations here, masters
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